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Abstract. This article presents the results of a methodology combining an extensive fieldwork, a formalization of field-based
individual rules and norms into an agent-based model and the implementation of scenarios analyzing the effects of social and
agro-ecological constraints on rural farmers through the study of three different sites in Nigerien Sahel. Two family transition
processes  are here  tested,  following  field  observations  and literature-based hypotheses:  family  organizations  can evolve
between a patriarchal mode and a non-cooperative one because of family income redistribution tensions. Family inheritance
systems can shift between a "customary" mode and a “local Muslim” one through family land availability tensions. Our
results show that both agro-ecological and socio-economic characteristics determine the simulated family type distribution
and  consequently  the  allocation  of  resources.  Results  from simulations  with  no evolution processes  show that  villages
specialize themselves on different economic activities according to natural resources: An intensification gradient is observed
from the most favored site, with more local productions and improved ecological indicators, to the less-favored one, with a
growing proportion of the population wealth coming from migration remittances and “off-shore” livestock. Once introducing
such processes, the differentiation also occurs within the population level, subdividing it into specializing groups according to
their  size,  their  assets  and  their  social  status.  Emerging  individualistic  family  types  increase  the  village  populations'
robustness through different and site-specific evolutions. 
Keywords: individual agent-based modeling, economic assets social distribution, family transition processes, inheritance,
family organization
 1 Introduction
Since the crises of the 70’s and 80’s, the Sahel has become the focus of strong debates on the importance of
social factors in the evolution of systems of activities and farming systems. More precisely and as systems of
activities in Sahelian Niger are based on small farms and families, the evolutions of this last scale are considered
by several scholars (Stone et al., 1990; Wiggins,1995; Stone & Downum, 1999) as crucial determinants of the
evolution of such systems,  along more environmental  ones that are the basis of the "desertification" concept
(Aubreville, 1949; Adams & Mortimore, 1997). Several scholars have acknowledged the population capacity to
adapt the rules of access to production assets and thereby the organization of the systems of activities they use.
In particular, the link between demography, social structure and resources has been noticed as far back as 1956
(Davis & Blake, 1956).
These  anticipating  adaptation  processes  are  already  taking  place  in  Nigerien  Sahel:  inheritance,  family
organization,  land  tenure,  social  and  symbolic  references  are  evolving,  because  of  economic  pressures  on
individuals, families, and communities. Milleville & Serpantié (1994), Lambin  et al.  (2001) Reenberg (2001)
and Tappan & McGahuey (2007) among others have all highlighted the major importance of social factors in
farming system evolution analyses. Grégoire (1986), Luxereau & Roussel (1997), Olivier de Sardan (2003), all
referring to the Sahelian part of Niger, have suggested two major, village-level social factors to consider as the
main pathways for local farming system evolutions: 
Family organizations: All the investigated literature that concerns local family evolutions described the average
family at the end of the 19th century as enlarged and quite strictly hierarchized. The father was ruling the whole
family, including servants and slaves, as one single consistent exploitation, management and decision unit. Such
families may be defined as enlarged (because they group several generations that are not allowed to leave the
family unit) and unitary (because members should obey one decision unit, i.e. the family head). Actually, this
unit was not fully independent: insecurity was forcing enlarged families to act as a group against foreigners,
usually under the rule of the old aristocracy or the rising warlords. Meanwhile, the French political pacification
at the beginning of the 20th century opened both the access to land in the Nigerien Sahel and to external jobs in
the Gulf of Guinea. Migrations and more individualistic behaviors trajectories multiplied (Timera, 2001) and
undermined the hierarchy foundations, rendering more and more difficult the justification of wealth and asset
concentration in the hands of a single person, the head of the enlarged household. We therefore hypothesize that
this led to an explosion of the family organization as theorized by Boserup (1965 pp. 316-346): The formerly
dominant unitary patriarchal family archetype was partly replaced by a mononuclear, multi-activity and multi-
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decision-led  family  type,  better  adapted  to  economic,  agroecological  and  social  shocks  as  described  and
simulated in Saqalli (2006).Actually, our census in three sites of the Nigerien Sahel reports the presence of both
types but in different proportions depending on the site1. It means that such a shift was not absolute but variable
depending  on  site  characteristics,  but  also  that  this  shift  has  occurred  in  all  the  Nigerien  Sahel.  Such
dismantlement of the family structure is actually described by an extensive literature regarding various sites in
Nigerien Sahel or the neighboring countries2:. 
Inheritance  modes:  In  the  19th century  and  because  of  the  need  for  powerful  and  enlarged  families  facing
insecurity  at this  time,  practices were  oriented to maintain  the  power  of the  lineage  more than equity.  The
legitimacy was then based on the "custom"3. Therefore, the so-called "customary" inheritance mode was based
on the entire transfer of all the land and assets of the father to his eldest son. It is considered to have been the
major inheritance system throughout the Sahelian part of the country up to the beginning of the 20th century
(Raynaut et al. 1997). It remains dominant in large parts of Nigerien Sahel, mostly in northern and less densely
populated zones and where land pressure is still low (Vanderlinden, 1998). As described by Luxereau & Roussel
(1997), Tiffen (2003) and Yamba (2004), due to the decrease of available land, this inheritance mode has shifted
in several  densely populated and land-saturated areas of Niger  to a  local  version of the Muslim inheritance
system4: land and livestock are equally shared only between direct heirs but gender specifically (i.e. female-
owned  livestock  is  shared  between  female  heirs  and  male-owned  livestock  and  land  between  male  heirs),
collateral relatives receiving a share only in the case of no living adult children5. This adaptation can therefore be
considered as a pathway for  farming  systems  transition because  of its  catalytic  reduction effect  on average
available land per family, without blatantly confronting the Muslim official principles that are even stronger in
the present time than one century ago. One should underline the effects of such an evolution: a reduction of the
average arable surface per family by including the cadets into the land allocation system means thereby that
families are more rapidly forced to choose whether to involve more in the agriculture production or to diversify
into external activities. It can be considered as a strong incentive for either intensification along a Boserupian
process or a disintensification one as described by Conelly (1994).
We then adopt these two processes as the first driving media on which families may evolve in Sahelian Niger
and  thereby  the  related  farming  systems.  Therefore,  our  objective  is  to  develop  answers  on  the  following
questions: What are therefore the long-term effects of such processes for the concerned families and farming
systems? Do these effects are equivalent for all Nigerien Sahel?
Local history should be included to characterize one village evolution perspective:  the complex structure of
Nigérien  farming  systems  cannot  be  considered  as  “traditional”  but  as  the  result  of  political  and  historical
evolving stakes. Therefore, farming system evolution modeling should be temporally based and determined not
on the  present-time  situation but  on the  initial  conditions,  i.e.  the  foundation  of  the  village.  Because  such
processes  are  conditioned  and  determined  by  both  socio-economic  and  agro-ecological  factors  acting  on  a
combined and intricate manner, it is irrelevant to focus on one side only. Therefore, for such a research, one
should consider looking for a tool that can put in balance all the different economic and production activities of a
Sahelian village but also all the factors that condition such activities, whatever the disciplines they belong. We
consider that such a tool can be a model based on individuals, in order to avoid household oversimplifications.
Meanwhile,  a  model  cannot  intrinsically  and  practically  conceive  all  the  possible  evolutions  of  a  society.
Scenarios and hypotheses have to be built. Comparing the outputs of the four combinations of these two factors
to determine the best theoretical  “solution” is not relevant because history shows  that these transitions have
already existed, which means  that  no comparison can be made between simulation results  and present  time
situations, as a confidence building step for a modeling tool. The analysis is therefore based on a comparison of
scenarios with or without evolution factors. 
Our purpose is then to analyze the effects of such transition pathways in several rural Nigerien Sahelian villages
with  different  levels  of  natural  resource  endowment  and socio-economic  opportunities  and  constraints.  The
purpose of the present article is to analyze the long-term impacts on village societies and farming systems of the
two agro-ecologically originated but  socially driven forces we  described above, i.e. family  organization and
inheritance mode transitions. 
1
 76% of our sample in Fakara (Tillabery region, southwestern Niger) belongs to the non-cooperative mononuclear type, 59%
for Gabi (Maradi region, south central Niger), 69% for Zermou (Zinder region, southeastern Niger).
2
 The disintegration of the enlarged family was noticed as far as 1914 for the Zarmaganda (Olivier de Sardan, 2003  p. 246)
3
 Islam values were less strong in Niger at the beginning of the 20th century and many anthropological works have shown the
resilience of animist  values,  references  & ceremonies  (for  instance  the  bori  or  possession  by djinns)  that  however  are
presently declining.
4
 Religion is the only counterforce to tradition to allow one modification of this very strategic rule of inheritance.
5
 One should notice that the main difference between the written and official Muslim law and reality is that almost all women
do not officially own fields, largely due to the tricks men use to avoid female land inheritance. It can happen that some
women officially inherit some pieces of land, but the social pressure forces them anyway to “delegate” the management to
some brothers. This phenomenon is actually widespread in all Muslim Africa. Cf. “harem and cousins” by Tillon (1966).
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 2 Methodology
 2.1 A Field & Modeling Process
The whole work of model construction can be seen as an iteration of ‘there and back’s’ between field working
and modeling as exposed by Drogoul  et al.  (2000). We based our analysis on an already built empirical and
KIDS agent-based model describing different village situations (Edmonds & Moss, 2005; Janssen & Ostrom,
2006).  The  selected  ABM  platform  is  CORMAS  (Common  Resources  Management  Agent-based  System)
developed by CIRAD (Bousquet et al., 1998). 
The modeling methodology, including the parametering functions and related sources for the agro-ecological and
village socio-economic modules is fully described in Saqalli (2006) as well as the individual-centered model
itself called, with relationships and dependencies between villagers (gender & rank as main factors of hierarchy
in the family; lineage & individual and family wealth as the main factors at the village level) as well as their
differentiated  accesses  to  economic  activities  (agriculture,  livestock  keeping,  seasonal  migration,  dry-season
gardening).  The  SimSahel  model  was  successfully  used  to  assess  the  impacts  of  development  proposals  in
Saqalli et al., (2008). The behavior rules are based upon the translation of the investigations that were done on
the three different survey sites, according to an interpretation process similar to that of Gladwin (1989) as cited
by Huigen et al., (2006). For the whole biophysical module (climatology, pedology et phyto-ecology) as well as
for  all  functions  that  are  not  related  with  socio-anthropological  logics  of  production  means  management
(demography,  price  evolutions  of  non  local  products),  rules  and  parameters  are  based  upon  the  available
published or unpublished literature6: The project that supported our research had collected extensive literature
and data sets during the last 20 years in three sites of the Sahelian Niger, namely Zermou in the region of Zinder,
Fakara  in  the  region of  Tillabery and  Gabi  in  the  region of  Maradi.  These  sites  represent  three  contrasted
situations of the global rainfed agro pastoral zone of Niger along a gradient of scarcity and aridity from the best-
endowed site of Gabi, then Fakara to the worst endowed Zermou (Table 1).
Table 1. Factors of differentiation between the three sites
Zermou Fakara Gabi 
Location Zinder Region, Eastern Niger Tillabery Region, Western Niger Maradi Region, Central Niger
Annual rainfall Mean: 350 mmVariability: [70-525 mm]
Mean: 450 mm 
Variability: [180-675 mm]
Mean: 550 mm
Variability: [275-775 mm]
Initial soil fertility Poor in average Average in average Good in average
Soil arability
proportion (%°)
Valley:
good
Plain:
average
Stony hills:
unsuitable
Valley:
good
Plain:
average
Plateaus:
unsuitable
Valley:
good
Plain:
average Hills: poor
0.1 69.9 30.0 3.9 79.6 16.5 18.1 60.0 21.9
Migration impact
on other activities
Gardening incompatible with
migration
No competition between gardening &
migration because of gender
differentiation
Gardening compatible with
migration
Migration
constraints
Transport costs: 45 kFCFA
Racket risks: 2%
Transport costs: 30 kFCFA
Racket risks: 1%
Transport costs: 5 kFCFA
Racket risks: 0,5%
Main ethnicity Hausa Zarma Hausa
Present time family
type Mononuclear Mononuclear Mononuclear
Women activity Sheep raising Sheep raising & gardening Sheep raising 
Men activity Farming, migration & gardening Farming & migration Farming, migration & gardening
Present time
inheritance system7 Local traditional Local traditional Local Muslim
 2.2 Building a model on family evolutions based on rural transition social driven pressures
This first implemented transition process, related to the family organization, was introduced in the model by
building a family attribute called "antiClan tension" or Tac, initially equal to zero at the family creation step. It
then evolves according to two effects. For all the adult family members who are not family heads or first heirs,
having to give back part of the gain generated in the activity of which he/she was the manager (migrant coming
back from migration, gardener bringing back the gains from his/her garden), in the hands of the family head
increases the Tac. Tac also rises at every new land extension, underlining the impact of this extension in the
6
 Reports & documents from development or research agencies, MSc & PhD research dissertations
7
 The customary so-called traditional mode is considered as favoring one of the male descents, usually the elder, by giving
him quite all the concerned assets, leaving symbolic elements and some small livestock to the others. The local adaptation of
the Muslim inheritance system shares the assets between all the male heirs, splitting half of the leg to the brothers of the dead
and half to his sons. 
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explosion of families8. In the two cases, the evolution is simulated as follows: for each event having an impact as
described above: Tac (t+1) = Tac (t) + 5       (1)
The family can shift from the unitary mode towards the non-cooperative one if: Tac (t) > 100* MoF (t)       (2)
If this condition is met, the marriage of a young groom means leaving his family and create his own on newly
occupied lands. This new family has its own initial value Tac equal to 0 as an initially unitary family. A part of
the gains stays in the hand of production activity managers and food distribution processes within the family are
shortened but weakened as described in Table 2.
Table 2. The simulated characteristics of the two simulated family structures
Unitary Family Structure Non Cooperative Family Structure
Family structure Married sons remain at home; Married sons leave home and build new families
Condition for
marriage The family head, most often the father, pay the dowry. The « fiancé » pay the dowry.
Sharing food
All income is given to the head of the family, who
shares them among members9. Therefore, the family
balance is equal to zero when he dies.
A « family granary » as an account to share to fulfill the
demands of family members 10. Family members’ balances
are maintained whatever happens to the head of the family.
Availability for
seasonal migration
The head of the family defines his manpower needs for
each millet cycle stage. Only him can allow a young
male family member to leave earlier for migration
A young male family member can leave for migration during
the millet-cropping season if there is still an elder with a
higher rank staying at home.
Fields extension Families do not explode and cropland expands based onfamily needs
The direct heir has all the inheritance; others have to settle
somewhere else.
The second  transition  process  considers  that  the  land  availability  constraint,  growing  with  the  difficulty  of
finding new lands, brings a growing "frustration" of the non-heirs. This frustration is simulated through a family
attribute called "land tenure tension" Tf, initially equal to zero at the family creation, that evolves at every failure
in the search of new empty lands, as follows: Tf (t+1) = Tf (t) + 5.       (3)
This value can grow rapidly according to the number of attempts: more the family is big and grows rapidly, more
this Tf value increase quickly. The family can adopt a "Muslim" inheritance mode if: Tf (t) > 200* MoF (t)     (4)
This procedure takes effect only after the death of the head of the family. It then imposes the sharing of lands
and of livestock according to this "local Muslim" rules, i.e. all fields are equally shared between the male heirs
of the head of the family (brothers and sons) while livestock is shared between male heirs for two thirds and
female heirs for one third.
It  is  important  to note  that  the simulated  social  evolutions  are reversible  and that  certain family  types  may
reappear. The calibration of these two processes has been jointly carried out for the three sites according to the
collected information and literature. Twenty simulations of each of the two scenarios have been assessed. 
Comparing the simulation outputs of these social change procedures with the present-day situation to determine
the  best  theoretical  “solution”  is  not  relevant  because  literature  shows  that  these  transitions  have  already
occurred,  hence  a  poor  fit  between  model  results  and  reality  for  a  given  combination  of  factors  does  not
invalidate the fact that this combination may have been relevant in the past. The comparison between simulation
results of our model and present time situations can therefore not be used as a confidence-building step. The
analysis is therefore based on a comparison of scenarios with or without evolution factors. Meanwhile, the model
has successfully passed a confidence building procedure by comparing literature data on demography and land
use with simulation results (Saqalli et al., 2008). Therefore, we compare the results of two scenarios:
• The first  one  is  the  "No-Evolution  Scenario",   where  farming  systems  and  populations  evolve  in  the
absence of family organization and inheritance changes as a reference level for comparative purpose.
• The second one is the "Evolution Scenario" where both family organization and inheritance systems can
change according to the rules described above.
Simulations begin with the foundation of the village by families that belong to family customary organizations
and traditional inheritance modes. The model scenarios are implemented on one-century long simulations. The
model initialization is realized as follows: at t=1 fifty villager Agents of various ages and gender-defined and
100 livestock head Objects, with one third of every species, appear in the village territory. We first analyze the
evolution  of  the  three  sites  over  a  100-year  period  according  to  the  "No-Evolution"  Scenario  to  compare
thereafter  with  the results  of the "Evolution" scenario.  The presented results  are selected for the purpose of
8
 Nearly all the villages where local history was investigated have witnessed a conflict between brothers or cousins within the
"reigning" family during the 20’s to 40’s era. A possibility to settle alone on empty lands can be considered as a permanent
attraction for villagers; we included this attraction at family level because more lands because of field expansion means more
economic power of the family head and more work for the family members while they may get this new land for themselves.
9
 Therefore,  all  gardening incomes remains  in women incomes in  the non cooperative  scenario  whereas,  in  the  unitary
scenario, even this money goes to the balance of the head of the family.
10
 Redistribution is limited to dependants of each active person in the family. It also means that a person who cannot afford
expenses for all his/her dependants can “ask” the head of he family or any person with a higher rank within the family for
support, only for that particular time step.
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illustrating the main divergences between scenarios. The selected variables do not stabilize themselves over time
because of the population growth that maintains itself throughout a simulation.
 3 Results
We compare firstly the evolution of the three sites over 100 years in the situation in the scenarios without family
organization changes. It permits us to envisage afterwards the comparison of these results with the scenarios that
include  the  simulated  social  changes.  The  presented  results  are  selected  for  illustrating  the  main evolution
divergences between scenarios.  The selected variables do not  stabilize themselves  over time because  of the
population growth that maintains itself throughout a simulation.
 3.1 Non-evolution scenarios: a degradation impact following agro-ecological and economical conditions
The results shown in Table 3 (appendix) are the simulation outputs of a scenario in which no family organization
or  inheritance  mode  evolutions  are  considered,  with  only  unitary  and  patriarchal  families  and  a  system of
customary inheritance.
The three population sites strongly raise, by a factor 11 in the site of Zermou, the least agro-ecologically and
socio-economically favored site, while Gabi, the most favored site, reaches a factor 32 (Table 3 line D).. The site
characteristics have therefore a noticeable effect on the simulated population growth. The simulated constraints
decrease  along a north to south Zermou-Fakara-Gabi gradient  and thereby their  consequence  on the related
simulated societies: 
The territory of each simulated site is progressively occupied, in less than 25 years for Zermou as opposed to
nearly 100 years for the Fakara and Gabi sites (Table 3 line A), because the lower soil fertility in Zermou (see
Table 2) implies rapid yield decline forcing the population to more quickly expand their fields, while Fakara and
Gabi do not experience such race for land. At the three sites, the simulated population continues to rise and there
is no collapse of agricultural production even after the total occupation of arable lands, despite the decline of soil
fertility  and vegetation,  but a  continued  decline  up  to  a  minimum  and stable  level.  The simulated  fertility-
regenerating procedures, which are the 1-year fallow regeneration process11 and the manure supply from herds,
seem to play a real effect on the fertility decline. Other non-agricultural and thereby rain-independent factors
(migration, gardening but also partly livestock) help to support the populations’ growths. 
Agriculture  appears  less  important  in  terms  of  income  share  than  expected  according  to  many  scholars
(Affholder, 1997; Breman et al., 2001; Dreschel et al., 2001)12. This activity, as the most sensitive to the agro-
climatic conditions, declines more or less rapidly at the three sites after an initial peak. This peak is longer at the
best site, namely Gabi (nearly for fifty years at  2/3 of the village global income) in comparison with the most
difficult site, namely Zermou (less than 10 years before declining). The decline extent is sensitive to the site
factor as well: agriculture represents at t=] 75:100] 44% of the village income in Gabi and Fakara but drops to
25% in Zermou. Gardening does not compensate everywhere this decrease of local agriculture: this activity is
nearly absent in Zermou, because of simulated agricultural reasons (the territory simulated in Zermou is nearly
totally void of irrigable parcels) but also because of social ones: As indicated in Table 2, gardening in the Hausa
sites of Zermou and Gabi is restricted to men, but the implemented impact of the distance to the Nigerian border
for Zermou does not allow men to practice simultaneously gardening and migration, while it is possible for men
in Gabi. Gardening does not take off until after land saturation, implying a manpower reallocation at the family
level. 
Simulated herds are progressively more and more cattle-dominated, that are in majority in transhumance during
nine months of the year and therefore with little effects on local fertility transfers but also independent from the
local pasture constraints. This cattle accumulation can therefore be considered as a way of "off-shore" savings13.
Livestock keeping maintains itself  all  along simulations,  whereas  migration grows slowly at the three sites,
reaching up to 45% of the total local income in Fakara. The gradient Gabi-Fakara-Zermou remains applicable for
the  irregularity  of  millet  yields.  An  equivalent  gradient  appears  for  migration,  because  of  the  highest
transportation cost  and  the  higher  racketing  risk  in  Zermou (Table 2)  but  not  for  gardening,  (because  it  is
independent from rainfall) and livestock keeping (because of the "off-shore" effect on almost the totality of the
herd, and thereby its quasi–independence from local conditions). Migration and livestock keeping, as extra-local
activities, play therefore a role of compensators facing the local resource limitations. 
This absence of collapse and the gradual decline of natural resources in the simulations are accompanied by the
stagnation and even the reduction of local subsistence means per inhabitant: actually, the cropped surface per
11
 This process is implemented only for fields that were sowed but whose sowings failed and were therefore abandoned for a
one-year fallow.
12
 See Niemeijer & Mazzucato (2002), Koning & Smaling (2005), Mortimore & Turner (2005) for a discussion on this gap.
13As  the  model  is  village-based,  it  does  not  take  in  account  the  question  whether  outside  transhumance  territories  can
accommodate such a cattle expansion, remembering the numerous incidents between herders and farmers observed in recent
times (Turner, 1999)
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inhabitant at the three sites declines over time (Table 3 line F). Only Gabi sees the average population income
maintained and growing a little in this scenario (Table 3 line E). The site of Zermou maintains its livestock per
inhabitant ratio, Fakara doubles it and Gabi sees it growing by a factor of 2.8 (Table 3 line G). These indicators
altogether  suggest  that  population and natural  resources of these three sites as they are implemented jointly
evolve but at a rate which depends on the initial conditions of each site.
This village scenario induces a rise in social inequalities. The income difference between men and women grows
at the three sites (Table 3 line H). The site of Fakara presents the weakest growth of this inequality,  mainly
because women are the managers and the first recipients of the gardening activity. One can, however, wonder
about a possible future appropriation by men of this  activity if  it becomes profitable,  which would counter-
balance the present-time male Zarma contempt for this activity. 
The Gini coefficient14 calculated between families along the simulation from the mean values of the repetitions
(Table  3  line  I)  underlines  the  social  differentiation  between  the  families,  in  particular  in  Fakara,  as  an
intermediate zone where differentiation is easier between families compared to Gabi where everybody can have
quite good income and to Zermou where everybody suffers from poor yields and low gains.
Finally,  the  standard-errors  show the  growing  vulnerability  of  these  simulated  systems:  the  standard-errors
between simulations of the population (Table 3 line D) increase according to the gradient Gabi-Fakara-Zermou,
indicating a higher potential vulnerability of the population of Zermou facing climatic and migration risks and
costs. The inter-annual coefficient of variation between simulations, calculated from the average annual figures,
has an average value of 2.15 in Zermou, 1.59 for Fakara and 0.78 for Gabi over that last 10 years (] 90: 100]). 
Thus, the unitary family organization allows the distribution of activities to evolve when local resources become
limited because of land saturation and/or degradation. This evolution favors external activities, particularly for
the least  favored site.  The villagers'  economic situation is  more  and more  limited  and fragile,  but  does not
collapse. This last point is important: it means that building a model where no cognitive and complicated rules
are  implemented  but  where  combining  different  economic  activities  at  the  family  and  individual  levels  is
possible, allows a shift of all or a part of the population from one activity to another to maintain or at least limit
the decline of the income because  of local resources decline.  The three sites seem therefore to "specialize"
themselves  in  one  activity  amongst  the  alternative  activities  from  millet  agriculture:  migration  in  Fakara,
gardening for Gabi and livestock keeping in Zermou.
 3.2 Introducing social evolutions: family shifts as accelerators of farming system evolutions
Results of the previous scenario are here compared with the simulation results of a scenario in which families
can evolve according to the social rules established by the modeling methodology. 
Family evolutions: same social rules but different contexts creating specific social stratifications. Families
multiplied themselves at all sites through the "explosion" of once unitary families due to the inheritance and
family  organization rules  we  implemented,  which  means  that  the breakup of  the  unitary  family  dilutes  and
alleviates these  tensions.  Thus, we find in Zermou 104.5 families on average vs.  9.7 in the "No-Evolution"
scenario at t=] 75:100], 117.4 families vs. 7.7 in Gabi and 204.5 families vs. 8.4 in Fakara! As Fakara presents
the  particularity  of  restricting  the  gardening  activity  to  women  and  thereby  creating  another  source  of
"frustration",  the  social  "frustration"  indicator  Tac  increases  more  rapidly  at  this  site  and  Unitary  families
disappear in Fakara five years earlier than at the two other sites (Figure 1.3 to compare with figures 1.1 & 1.5).
Moreover, the extent of this shift is far more important in Fakara, reducing the part of Unitary Families with a
Customary Inheritance (UFCIS) to less than 5% of the number of families, but 19% of the total population. The
Non-Cooperative Families with a Customary Inheritance (NCFCIS) become dominant reaching up to 59% of all
families and 52% of the village population (Figure 1.4). The arable land saturation is slower than in the "No-
Evolution" scenario can be seen from a comparison between lines A of Table 3 and 2. Consequently, the shift
towards the local Muslim inheritance mode remains limited. At the two other sites, with a more rapid arable land
saturation,  the Non-Cooperative  & "local Muslim"  Inheritance Families  (NCFMIS) become dominant  in the
number of families and even in the village population for Gabi (figures 1.5 & 1.6). 
A family type unobserved during field investigations appears in simulations at the three sites: the Unitary Family
with the "local Muslim" Inheritance (UFMIS). It occurs in case of land-limited and little multi-active families.
Paradoxically, it is the site of Gabi, with more facilities for multi-activity (large irrigable land availability and
cheaper seasonal migration), that maintains a more important proportion of such unitary families, reaching more
than 20% (Figure 1.4) against 6% in Zermou (Figure 1.1) and 3% in Fakara. This development in Gabi could be
explained by the fact that economic activities remain in the hands of the men, who can combine gardening and
14
 For n  slices,  the coefficient  is  obtained by the Brown formula  (Dorfman,  1979).  We have chosen n = 5 as  used  in
demographic studies): 
 
. Xk: the income of the k slice; Yk: the income of the k slice.
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migration thanks  to the proximity  of the border (Table 2), which allows the unitary organization to remain.
Paradoxically,  this  group  appears  after  the  NCFMIS at  the  three  sites  rather  than  before  these.  They  may
originate from formerly UFCIS families but also from formerly NCFMIS having evolved directly into UFMIS,
in the case of the young families having many young children and being unable to develop yet some activities
other than the ones managed by the head of the family. In order to corroborate this appearance, one may notice
that  in urban and semi-urban areas of the  Maradi region where Gabi  is  located, the development  of a new
middle-class of traders, called the "izalah", rather young families and very rigorous from a religious point of
view15, besides the old and big traders having established their fortune on clientele networks (Gregoire, 1986).
We thereby suppose that the main reason why we did not observe such families in the investigated villages is
that they have already shift in town, even if they still have and crop (and/or make crop) their fields in the village.
We obtain thus for each simulated site a different village organization (Figures 1.1,  1.3 & 1.5): the sites of
Fakara and Zermou as they are implemented are almost  totally composed of Non-Cooperative mononuclear
families. They are shared in Zermou between Muslim inheritance families for the 2/3 and customary inheritance
families for 1/3, while these proportions are inverted for Fakara. Finally, the Gabi population is shared between
the two family types, unitary (1/3) and non-cooperative (2/3) and the two inheritance systems, customary (1/4) and
Muslim (3/4).  These proportions  are  important  as  they determine  the proportion of "decision-makers"  in the
population (family heads only in the case of unitary families,  a lot of adults  in the case of non-cooperative
families), whereas the proportions in terms of population, different from the family proportions because of the
gap in family size between the family types, define the consequences of these decisions on the total population.
Figure 1. Proportions of the four different family categories & the different activities in each site
Production and sustainability at the village level. The new family type appearing has several impacts on the
simulated village wealth (Table 4 Appendix): 
As described in , the appearance of mononuclear families in Fakara slows the growth of the global population
and of cultivated surfaces in a similar way than harsher agro-ecological and economic conditions (Table 3 & 4,
15
 This Islamic legitimacy allows them to limit their solidarity to the "zakat", the Muslim alms pillar, and therefore to be able
to foresee their management and to free it from social and family contingencies. 
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line A & D), because of the increased delay for marriage (no intra-family support for the dowry and thereby
restriction on farm settlements).  Meanwhile,  the two  sites  of Gabi  and of Zermou are largely different:  the
absence of a significant difference between the two scenarios on land saturation and population can be explained
first because the number of families is half of that of Fakara and second because about 50% of the population
still  belongs  to  unitary  families  that  favor  demographic  growth.  Moreover,  one  can  consider  that  the
discriminating effect of the new family organizations does not appear so much for these two sites: In Zermou,
the monetary constraint is already strong enough for the "No-Evolution" scenario (livestock and income per
capita are there already the smallest figures of the three sites); therefore, new family modes do not reduce much
more the growth of the population. One can suppose as well that the monetary limits in Gabi that appear along
the simulation with these new families are not strong enough at the family and individual level to slow down
marriages in significant way and thereby the growth of the population. The average income in the "Evolution"
scenario increases in the second half of the simulation at the three sites and more particularly in Gabi (Table 3 &
4, line E) compared to the "No-Evolution" scenario. The cropped surface per inhabitant doubles in Fakara in the
"Evolution" scenario because of the lower population growth, which is logically not observed in Zermou or in
Gabi (Table 3 & 4, line F). Inversely, if the livestock herd size per inhabitant is more than three times higher in
Zermou and more than two times higher in Gabi in the "Evolution" scenario compared with the "No-Evolution"
one, it grows in an equivalent manner for the two scenarios in Fakara (Table 3 & 4, line G).
Therefore, considering both income and livestock altogether, the three simulated sites experience a better level of
wealth per capita. However, the most-favored and the less-favored sites get this improvement through livestock
savings while the intermediate get this improvement thanks to a lowering of its population, because of a quicker
orientation towards non-cooperative family modes.
In terms of environmental sustainability, although the land is more slowly colonized in the "Evolution" scenario,
yields per hectare remain equivalent for both scenarios at the three implemented sites (Table 3 & 4, line B). The
same is true for the vegetation cover in the two poorest sites, i.e. Zermou and Fakara (Table 3 & 4, line C). Gabi
sees a slightly stronger decline in vegetation cover, related to a larger cultivated area and a higher livestock per
inhabitant ratio. In terms of social sustainability, inequalities between families and between gender reduce in two
sites: if the coefficients of variation of the gender inequality are significantly reduced in Zermou and for Fakara,
they stay equivalent in Gabi (Table 3 & 4, line H). The inequality between families instead is higher in the
"Evolution" scenario in Zermou and Gabi whereas it is significantly reduced in Fakara (Table 3 & 4, line I).
Finally,  the  coefficients  of  variation  between  repetitions  of  several  factors  (population,  income  &  surface
appropriated  per  capita)  are  significantly  lower  for  the  three  sites  (Table  3  &  4,  lines  D,  E  &  F)  in  the
"Evolution" scenario, which means that the collapse risk of the income and/or of the population, following a
drought for instance, are reduced thanks to these new family types. However, the livestock per inhabitant is less
stable: the new scenario plays its stabilizing part on this factor only for Gabi whereas no difference appears for
Fakara and the variability even increases in Zermou (Table 3 & 4, line G).
Therefore, the populations of the three sites as they are implemented seem to be more robust to the hazards of
production activities. This new robustness, together with a higher average income per capita, seems in the case
of Fakara to come from a population reduction while it seems to be acquired by a clear increase of livestock in
the case of the two other sites. However, in this case as well, it is necessary to consider the impacts of other
activities (gardening & migration) in the analysis of the adaptation ways of the new families, in order to explain
the economic connections between genders and between family types.
Activities and livestock distribution.  The social differentiation does not translate into a significant change in
the  relative  importance  of  the  different  activities  at  Zermou.  Agriculture  keeps  declining  to  the  benefit  of
livestock keeping and migration, the latter reaching about 72% of the average income, while gardening stays
next to nothing.
However, a strong evolution at Zermou occurs towards small livestock. This goes together with a multiplication
by 3.9 of the volume of this herd (939±89 TLU vs. 240±39 in the "No-Evolution" scenario over the last 25
years).  One  can notice  the  multiplication  by 28 of the  number  of  goats  (254  vs.  9  in  the  "No-Evolution"
scenario),  the  caprine  herd  thereby representing  33% of  the  total  livestock  vs.  5% in  the  "No-Evolution"
scenario, without a particularly strong decline of the vegetation cover (Table 3 line C). This results from the
new social  rules  introduced  by  this  scenario,  which  leads  to  the  multiplication  of  individual  strategies  of
livestock accumulation, geared towards goat and sheep that are less expensive. One may notice that the average
sheep herd in Zermou increases from 2 to 18 units with the "Evolution" scenario, that is to say an evolution in
the same proportion than that of the number of families. With one sheep per family to slaughter every year for
the Tabaski ceremony, it means that despite the explosion of families, one family out of five can fulfill its social
chores, similar to the "No-Evolution" scenario. It is an interesting indicator of the economic viability of these
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families. With a tripling of the number of cattle, this added livestock is nearly independent of local pastoral
conditions, thanks to the transhumance.
The site of Fakara sees the income contribution of migration rising (66% of the average income over the last 25
years against 39% in the case of the "No-Evolution" scenario), reducing the parts of gardening, agriculture and
livestock keeping. The volume of the Fakara herd stays stable (837 ± 98 TLU vs. 952 ± 87 in the case of the
"No-Evolution" scenario),  but  the composition evolves strongly as well  with  a multiplication by 7.2 of the
goats, and by 3.7 of the sheep. Finally, the Gabi activities also change but through a focus on local activities.
Agriculture and gardening are maintained, with a slight extension of the latter. Migration passes from 26% of
the average income to less than 6%, whereas livestock keeping reaches 29% vs.  2% in the "No-Evolution"
scenario. This strong growth can be explained by the same but more intense shift as observed at the two other
sites, i.e. a multiplication of the small ruminants: 611 sheep and 1910 goats vs. 11 sheep and 9 goats in the "No-
Evolution" scenario on average over the last 25 years, increasing the proportion of small ruminants from 1% to
37% of the total. These small ruminants are characterized by a life cycle turnover far more rapid than that of
cattle, allowing for an increase of the number of sales and of auto-consumption. As the small ruminants stay on
the village  territory,  their  higher  numbers  means  a  higher  fertility  transfer  from grazing  areas towards  the
cropped fields. The multiplication of families means that a more important part of the cattle herd does not leave
for transhumance as well, as the model forces each family to keep in the village territory some cattle, thereby
reinforcing the fertility transfer effect but also the pressure on grazing lands.
As a partial conclusion, at the three sites, livestock keeping seems to change its status from of an "off-shore"
saving account to that of a locally used "remunerating" account, particularly for the most favored site of Gabi. If
no evolution in terms of activity distribution appears at the least favored site of Zermou, migration becomes
preponderant in Fakara, whereas it is livestock keeping and gardening that plays this role for Gabi.
Production & sustainability at the family type levels. Analyzing the differences in indicator values among the
family types provides information on their differentiated reactions throughout the 100 years of simulation. Table
3 presents the average values over the last 25 years of several indicators for each family type. 
It is not the same social types that benefit from a better income per capita in the three sites (Table 5 line A): If
the gaps  between the types  stays  small  in Zermou,  with  a slight  advantage for NCFCIS in a globally poor
context, the UFCIS of the two other sites remains the poorest, which can be explained by a higher ratio between
children and adults. On the other hand, the NCFMIS income per capita reaches double that of other groups for
these two sites. A high level of income does not imply an important availability in fields or in livestock (Table 5
line C & E), but rather more efficient orientation of the available manpower. As a matter of fact, the modeling
does not introduce any cognitive process in the individual or family manpower allocation between activities,
because these are quite practically not competing for manpower in terms of time schedule (migration mainly
occurs after harvesting times). It is the "natural" evolution in terms of manpower, population and land access of
the various family types that determines this allocation. For example, the proportion of fields owned by the
UFCIS always  stays  important  even with a small  population,  because of their  anteriority in the conquest  of
arable fields.
The social organization profiles of Zermou and of Fakara can therefore be explained by the historical succession
of the family types (Figures 1.1 & 1.5): the eldest group, the UFCIS, is the most involved in agriculture, whereas
the most recent, the UFMIS, is the most involved in migration (Table 5 lines J & L). This last group can be
considered as quite "absents" of the village, reducing their involvement in local activities. The Gabi population is
different:  it  is  influenced  by a  highest  proportion of the  UFMIS and by a  highest  field  availability,  and in
particular garden-suitable fields: as opposed to the two other sites, the UFMIS type in Gabi see a large part of its
income coming from local productions (gardening and agriculture). Also, the NCFMIS are land-limited but have
a more  "efficient"  manpower:  because  they are  non-cooperative,  they can orient  themselves  in  a privileged
manner towards gardening. The part of income coming from livestock keeping is hard to interpret because it is
not entirely linked to the size of the herd but more likely to its turnover rate that is quicker for small ruminants.
The part of these small  ruminants is growing along an UFCIS-UFMIS-NCFCIS-NCFMIS gradient,  which is
compatible with the growing monetary constraints of these types of family (Figures 1.1, 1.3 & 1.5).
Thus,  the interpretation of the relationships  between family  types and economic  families  may be uneasy to
interpret because it is ruled by complex micro-interactions. However, the distribution of the chosen indicators
highlights a differentiation between family types that looks like the strategies one can observe in the field: The
Fakara and Zermou see their  populations  differentiate  themselves  into  family  groups strongly related to the
succession of their appearance: the first arrived UFCIS maintain a strong agricultural involvement, as opposed to
the last two groups, mainly orientated towards the external activities (migration and cattle keeping). On the other
hand, higher suitable land availability in Gabi permits the maintenance of local activities for all family types,
particularly thanks to gardening.
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Table 5. Selected indicator mean values for the last quarter t=] 75-100] for the three sites for the "Evolution" scenario
(Mean+standard deviation; n=20).
Zermou
UFCIS NCFCIS NCFMIS UFMIS
Income per capita (in €) 4.7 ± 0.2 6.8 ± 0.3 5.4 ± 0.7 2.2 ± 0.3 A
Income proportion (%) 24.9 ± 0.9 33.2 ± 1.7 33.0 ± 4.2 9.0 ± 1.4 B
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 2.5 ± 0.7 0.7 ± 0.2 1.0 ± 0.4 1.2 ± 0.3 C
Livestock proportion (%) 47.6 ± 14.6 13.1 ± 2.3 22.3 ± 8.4 17.0 ± 4.7 D
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 1.0 ± 0.02 0.9 ± 0.08 0.3 ± 0.02 0.6 ± 0.06 E
Cropped surface proportion (%) 38.8 ± 0.7 31.3 ± 2.7 11.2 ± 0.9 18.7 ± 1.7 F
Yields (q/ha) 3,4 ± 0.4 3,6 ± 0.3 4,0 ± 0.3 3,8 ± 0.2 G
Coef. Gini between families 0.75± 0.01 0.63± 0.03 0.61 ± 0.02 0.88± 0.01 H
Livestock keeping proportion in the income (%) 13 ± 3 5 ± 0.9 11 ± 2 6 ± 1.2 I
Migration proportion in the income (%) 52 ± 5 79 ± 8 67 ± 7 89 ± 9 J
Gardening proportion in the income (%) 2 ± 0.1 1 ± 0.1 4 ± 0.1 1 ± 0.1 K
Pearl millet agriculture proportion in the income (%) 33 ± 7 15 ± 2 17 ± 2 4 ± 1 L
Fakara
UFCIS NCFCIS NCFMIS UFMIS
Income per capita (in €) 7.6 ± 0.2 12.5 ± 0.2 22.8 ± 0.8 12.3 ± 0.5 A
Income proportion (%) 11.0 ± 0.2 51.6 ± 0.7 26.1 ± 0.9 11.3 ± 0.4 B
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.5 ± 0.1 1.0 ± 0.3 0.7 ± 0.3 0.5 ± 0.2 C
Livestock proportion (%) 13,0 ± 1.8 65.7 ± 15.0 13,1 ± 4.2 8,2 ± 2.2 D
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 0.9 ± 0.03 0.7 ± 0.02 0.6± 0.02 0.3 ± 0.02 E
Cropped surface proportion (%) 24.4 ± 0.1 57.7 ± 1.9 12.8 ± 2.1 5.1 ± 0.4 F
Yields (q/ha) 3.6 ± 0.3 4.2 ± 0.3 3.9 ± 0.2 3.7 ± 0.2 G
Coef. Gini between families 0.73± 0.01 0.63 ± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.03 0.90 ± 0.04 H
Livestock keeping proportion in the income (%) 7 ± 1 10 ± 2 10 ± 1 9 ± 2 I
Migration proportion in the income (%) 36 ± 2 52 ± 4 58 ± 4 69 ± 6 J
Gardening proportion in the income (%) 12 ± 2 8 ± 0.4 11 ± 2 6 ±0.6 K
Pearl millet agriculture proportion in the income (%) 45 ± 5 30 ± 3 21 ± 5 16 ± 2 L
Gabi
UFCIS NCFCIS NCFMIS UFMIS
Income per capita (in €) 10.6 ± 0.7 14.5 ± 1.2 25.9 ± 2.9 17.0 ± 1.6 A
Income proportion (%) 15.2 ± 1.1 2.2 ± 0.2 65.1 ± 7.3 17.4 ± 1.7 B
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 1.6 ± 0.4 1.5 ± 0.5 2.2 ± 0.9 2.4 ± 0.7 C
Livestock proportion (%) 21.3 ± 3.1 02.1 ± 0.3 53.1 ± 15.0 23.3 ± 4.8 D
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 0.2 ± 0.04 0.7 ± 0.24 0.4 ± 0.08 0.2 ± 0.03 E
Cropped surface proportion (%) 20.3 ± 3.3 6.5 ± 2.2 62.3 ± 11.5 10.9 ± 1.6 F
Yields (q/ha) 5.8 ± 0.7 8.1 ± 0.7 3.7 ± 0.3 3.5 ± 0.2 G
Coef. Gini between families 0.73 ± 0.01 0.59 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.02 0.81 ± 0.04 H
Livestock keeping proportion in the income (%) 13 ± 1.1 22 ± 2 15 ± 1.4 28 ± 3 I
Migration proportion in the income (%) 3 ± 0.4 14 ± 1 5 ± 1 17 ± 2 J
Gardening proportion in the income (%) 34 ± 2 22 ± 1 49 ± 3 21 ± 1 K
Pearl millet agriculture proportion in the income (%) 50 ± 2 42 ± 2 31 ± 2 34 ± 2 L
* Combined weed and shrub vegetation
 4 Conclusion
Introducing social change processes in a social model generates social groups with differentiated behaviors: New
social restrictions limit the intra-family support, which has for consequence to restrain more strongly the income
sharing at the individual level to his/her close family network. It let a bigger reinvestment at the local level
through small livestock keeping and gardening, but also a higher level of "adequacy" to local resources, via
various  "strategies"  (lowering of the population for Fakara,  creation of a class of "permanent"  migrants for
Zermou or a class of "gardeners" for Gabi). These strategies are different for every site but permit to increase the
robustness of the society and to limit the degradation of the local environment.  Moreover,  as heads of non-
cooperative families  do not  control  their  members anymore,  there are more autonomous individuals  in their
choice  of  economic  activities  other  than  agriculture.  As  the  gain  from  extra-agricultural  activities  is  more
important than from cropping, these groups of non-cooperative families have a higher level of income per capita.
Finally, the history and the social origin of these groups do matter because it defines the final distribution of
access to production assets between family types.
Thus, the introduction of social evolution factors (i.e. the inheritance mode and the family organization) induced
changes that corroborate a Boserupian approach of farming transitions, but with a nuance regarding the potential
extent of such changes. Even within these sites, each family and each individual does not have the same chances
of development and strong divergences appear: the least favored site population "exports" its wealth outside the
territory through cattle  "off-shore" savings and does not experience any intensification;  the intermediate  site
evolves towards a South African-style split of its population according to social origins between farming families
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and migrant families. The most favored site population is the only one to intensify its practices (better integration
of livestock keeping and more gardening).
Therefore, the model results permit to confirm that: 
• It  is  possible  to combine socio-anthropological  and agro-ecological  factors in a model.  A validation is
always  complex and difficult  but  the  reconstitution of collective  and differentiated  behaviors  based on
simple and empirical behavior rules underlines the interest of such Agent-based modeling methodologies
for analyzing the interactions between social and farming systems.
• Beyond the methodological aspects, we have shown that social factors have an impact on farming systems
at least as strong as economic or agronomic factors. However,  because such social factors are different
according to the villages and the sites but related to environmental ones, they have different and non-linear
effects on the village evolutions16. 
• Moreover,  beyond  the  quantitative  differentiations,  the  integration  of  these  factors  informs  on  the
discriminations  between  categories  of  gender  and  of  family  groups.  Such  informations  that  cannot  be
approached with other methods may help to increase the proportion of people benefiting from development
projects in Niger and for the whole Sahel.
The  present  simulations  take  in  account  two  perceived  main  factors of social  differentiation.  In  the future,
additional factors that were observed in the field and may be important factors of emergence could be included.
For instance, the transhumant Fulani herders, who had formerly an important role of fertility transfer are not
simulated, as well as the high proportion of divorces (two marriages in five according to our observations) that
reinforce the autonomy of women through their herds and their gardening productions. Additional social changes
could  be  considered  as  the  driving  forces  of  evolution  of  farming  systems:  the  progressive  settlements  of
transhumants  and  nomads,  the  choice  of  activity  according  to  the  gains  in  terms  of  social  reputation  and
economic gains, the development of communication network and in particular road and transportation networks
that have allowed in the past the take-off of the seasonal migration activity. The introduction of a development
project may also be an important trail from a more operational decision-support point of view.
More fundamentally,  modeling  social  systems  poses  problems  as underlined  by Chattoe  (2002):  simulating
individual behavior implies to postulate some reasoning, even if these are defined in the simplest possible way.
Moreover, it requires parameterization of the factors that have an influence on these behaviors. Choosing such
reasoning's and the related parameters are open to discussion unless based on systematic investigations still too
heavy, too long-term and too costly to justify. It is difficult to establish the extent of such changes, the impacts
and the "weight" of each parameter because this needs time for investigation but also because these phenomena
take place over several generations.
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 6 Appendix
Table 3. 100 years evolution of selected indicators for the three sites in a No-Evolution Scenario (fixed unitary family & customary
inheritance system) (Mean + standard deviation; n=20). 
Zermou
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 29.9 79.6 94.3 100 100 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 5.4 ± 0.8 4.6 ± 0.7 3.8 ± 0.5 3.6 ± 0.5 3.6 ± 0.5 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 80.5 ±15.8 39.7 ± 5.2 16.8 ± 4.8 10.5 ± 4.4 7.6 ± 1.7 C
Average population
performances
Population size 47 ± 12 69± 24 152 ± 58 313 ± 120 495 ± 284 D
Income per capita (in €) 18.3 ± 8.1 17.3 ± 0.4 5.7 ± 0.8 4.2 ± 1.0 3.3 ± 0.7 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 2.3± 0.6 4.2 ± 0.5 2.2 ± 0.2 1.2 ± 0.1 0.7 ± 0.1 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.4 ± 0.1 0.5 ± 0.2 0.4 ± 0.2 0.6 ± 0.2 0.4 ± 0.2 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 1.6 ± 0.2 1.7 ± 0.2 1.7 ± 0.2 2.8 ± 0.4 4.3 ± 0.5 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.48 ±0.14 0.55 ±0.11 0.60 ±0.08 0.65 ±0.08 0.68±0.09 I
Fakara
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 04.7 13.2 59.8 94.2 97.8 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 5.8 ± 0.9 4.8 ± 0.6 4.4 ± 0.3 4.1 ± 0.2 4.0 ± 0.2 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 93.9 ± 7.2 81.5 ± 4.1 46.4 ± 5.3 18.3 ± 3.0 12.3 ± 2.3 C
Average population
performances
Population size 50 ± 2 80 ± 15 223 ± 69 639 ± 209 1246 ±386 D
Income per capita (in €) 39.7 ± 5.1 30.9 ± 1.5 14.3 ± 1.1 12.4 ± 0.9 10.5 ± 1.2 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 0.5 ± 0.2 0.9 ± 0.3 1.4 ± 0.2 0.8 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.05 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.4 ± 0.1 0.5 ± 0.2 0.4 ± 0.2 0.6 ± 0.2 0.8 ± 0.2 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 1.7 ± 0.2 1.4 ± 0.1 1.3 ± 0.1 1.9 ± 0.3 2.3 ± 0.4 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.50 ±0.11 0.53 ±0.06 0.61 ±0.02 0.68 ±0.02 0.74 ±0.02 I
Gabi
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 04.3 07.1 24.3 67.1 98.4 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 9.3 ± 1.8 5.4 ± 0.7 4.9 ± 0.4 4.4 ± 0.3 4.2 ± 0.2 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 105.2 ± 8.4 93.8 ± 4.5 63.2 ± 6.7 30.6 ± 4.9 14.9 ± 1.9 C
Average population
performances
Population size 51 ± 1 75 ± 15 189 ± 53 579 ± 169 1591 ±419 D
Income per capita (in €) 43.8 ± 8.6 32.6 ± 4.3 17.0 ± 1.7 20.5 ± 2.2 36.3 ± 2.9 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 0.4 ± 0.2 0.5 ± 0.2 0.6 ± 0.1 0.5 ± 0.1 0.3 ± 0.08 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.4 ± 0.1 0.6 ± 0.2 0.7 ± 0.2 0.8 ± 0.1 1.1 ± 0.3 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 2.1 ± 0.2 1.9 ± 0.1 1.6 ± 0.1 3.5 ± 0.2 5.7 ± 0.5 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.53 ±0.14 0.61 ±0.09 0.59 ±0.03 0.63 ±0.01 0.66 ±0.02 I
* Combined weed and shrub vegetation
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Table 4. 100 years evolution of selected indicators for the three sites in the Evolution scenario (family organizations & inheritance
systems can change) (Mean + standard deviation; n=20) 
Zermou
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 28.9 83.8 100 100 100 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 6.2 ± 0.5 4.9 ± 0.3 4.0 ± 0.2 3.9 ± 0.2 3.8 ± 0.1 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 85.6 ±11.1 42.2 ± 4.1 18.2 ± 4.9 10.9 ± 4.0 8.0 ± 1.5 C
Average population
performances
Population size 50 ± 3 76 ± 11 181 ± 35 333 ± 93 545 ± 168 D
Income per capita (in €) 21.6 ± 7.7 13.4 ±2.6 4.3 ± 0.6 4.4 ± 0.4 4.9 ± 0.4 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 2.1 ± 0.4 4.0 ± 0.5 2.0 ± 0.2 1.1 ± 0.1 0.7 ± 0.04 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.5 ± 0.1 0.5 ± 0.1 0.6± 0.2 1.1 ± 0.2 1.3 ± 0.4 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 1.8 ± 0.3 1.7 ± 0.1 1.7 ± 0.2 2.7 ± 0.3 3.4 ± 0.4 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.51 ±0.14 0.60 ±0.10 0.64 ±0.05 0.73 ±0.02 0.71 ±0.02 I
Fakara
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 04.6 10.8 55.4 81.2 88.5 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 6.3 ± 1.1 4.7 ± 0.7 4.4 ± 0.4 4.2 ± 0.2 4.0 ± 0.2 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 94.1 ± 6.4 82.5 ± 3.9 47.0 ± 4.8 20.7 ± 3.0 13.0 ± 2.3 C
Average population
performances
Population size 51 ± 1 80 ± 13 198 ± 54 421 ± 159 704 ± 156 D
Income per capita (in €) 51.8 ± 6.7 53.4 ±2.4 11.2 ± 0.6 11.3 ± 0.4 13.1 ± 0.3 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 0.5 ± 0.1 0.7 ± 0.2 1.5 ± 0.1 1.0 ± 0.1 0.7 ± 0.03 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.5 ± 0.1 0.6 ± 0.2 0.4 ± 0.1 0.5 ± 0.1 0.8 ± 0.2 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 1.6 ± 0.1 1.3 ± 0.1 1.2 ± 0.1 1.6 ± 0.2 1.9 ± 0.3 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.50 ±0.14 0.54 ±0.05 0.60 ±0.03 0.68 ±0.02 0.68 ±0.02 I
Gabi
1 2-25 26-50 51-75 76-99
Environ-mental
sustainability
Arable land saturation (%) 22.5 76.0 100 100 100 A
Pearl millet yields (quintals / ha) 10.3 ± 0.7 5.8 ± 0.3 4.6 ± 0.2 4.4 ± 0.2 4.4 ± 0.2 B
Vegetation cover (% of the initial cover)* 100.8 ± 9.2 47.3 ± 3.7 14.8 ± 3.4 12.3 ± 2.7 11.5 ± 2.6 C
Average population
performances
Population size 51 ± 1 77 ± 12 210 ± 44 607 ± 102 1475 ±199 D
Income per capita (in €) 38.9 ± 7.8 26.2 ± 1.6 14.9 ± 1.0 16.7 ± 1.2 19.5 ± 3.0 E
Cropped surface per capita (in ha) 2.1 ± 0.6 4.7 ± 0.7 2.3 ± 0.4 0.8 ± 0.1 0.3 ± 0.06 F
Livestock size per capita (in L.S.U. equiv.) 0.5 ± 0.1 1.0 ± 0.2 1.4 ± 0.3 2.0 ± 0.4 2.5 ± 0.6 G
Social sustainability Male/female income ratio 2.1 ± 0.3 1.8 ± 0.1 1.6 ± 0.1 3.9 ± 0.3 6.2 ± 0.4 HCoefficient of Gini between families 0.54 ±0.13 0.52±0.05 0.62 ±0.04 0.70 ±0.02 0.70 ±0.02 I
* Combined weed and shrub vegetation
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